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How do people make decisions? Conventional, logical thinking would have us believe that we base our decisions on
optimisation; that people follow a principle of probability and reason, so as to maximise their utility. While that may
make for a "beautiful mathematical system", what happens when the assumptions of neoclassical economics fall
short? A question posed by Gerd Gigerenzer, Director at the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC)
(http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/research/adaptive-behavior-and-cognition), Max Planck Institute for Human
Development, Berlin.
Speaking at a forum (http://www.smu.edu.sg/institutes/bsi/events.asp) organised by SMU's Behavioural Sciences
Institute (http://www.smu.edu.sg/institutes/bsi/index.asp), Gigerenzer told the crowded room of mostly academics
this story: "A professor from Columbia University had an offer from Harvard. He couldn't make up his mind – whether
he should accept or reject… So a colleague took him aside and said, 'What is your problem? Just maximise your
expected utility! You always tell your students to do so.' Exasperated, the professor responded, 'C'mon, this is
serious.'"
In an uncertain world, people require some biases in order to make better inferences, he said. 'Optimisation', as seen
through rational economic frames, may not always be within the reach of the human mind. And this is where
'heuristics' may be of some help.
Strong feelings
A widely-published (http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/staff/gerd-gigerenzer) psychology professor in the area of
heuristics and bounded rationality in decision making, Gigerenzer explained that 'heuristics', put simply, is a rule that
directs focus to areas that matter, and in the process, blocking out non-essential information. The end result: faster
decisions with less information. Seems too good to be true, and so Gigerenzer provides examples.
In 2009, US Airways Flight 1549 experienced engine problems just moments after take-off from LaGuardia Airport in
New York City. At that point, Captain Chesley Sullenberger, the pilot, made a quick decision to land the plane on the
Hudson River. Even with some four decades of flying experience, it was highly unlikely that at that point in time,
Sullenberger was of mind to rationalise and perform mathematical calculations of how his odds were stacked at that
point. Yet, he arrived at a decision that allowed all 155 of his passengers and crew to return to safety.
Another common example is seen in sports, where players rely a lot on strong feelings that are not easily understood
or rationalised. Citing Richard Dawkins' 'The Selfish Gene', he read, "When a man throws a ball high in the air and
catches it again… he behaves as if he had solved a set of differential equations in predicting the trajectory of the
ball… At some subconscious level, something functionally equivalent to the mathematical calculations is going on."
Here, Gigerenzer drew the audience's attention to the fact that Dawkins had used the words 'as if' to suggest that it
cannot be true that people's brains are making mathematical calculations at such instances. Research has, however,
shown that players rely on heuristics – and in this case, the gaze heuristic.
"The first is to fixate the ball with your eyes. Second, start running. Third, adjust the running speed so that the
angle of the gaze remains constant." Also, the player runs in a way such that his or her gaze remains constant,
ignoring variables that are irrelevant, for instance, noise, and focusing on factors that could matter, such as wind
speed, wind direction, spin, etc.
How do experienced players know how to arrive at the best decisions? They have a little adaptive toolbox, said
Gigerenzer. "If you ever interview soccer players; what did they do, how do they do it so well, they will usually tell
you they have no idea; it's intuitive… a strong feeling about what to do but you can't explain."
A number of experiments have shown that players, like everyone here, have a little adaptive toolbox, he noted. And
what this example illustrates is that complex problems do not necessarily require complex solutions. "But, for some
reason, we don't think about simplicity; we always want something complex, maybe to impress someone else." 
Less is more
People often think that heuristics come at the cost of accuracy and effort; that it cannot be accurate because less
effort had been invested on information and computation. This is not true as "there are situations where one attains
higher accuracy with less effort," Gigerenzer wrote in 'Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences',
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a paper on which the lecture was based. 
He cited a study conducted by Wübben & Wangenheim (2008) where a big company, in deciding to send a catalogue
to its database of customers, used, in one condition, a heuristic that took into account if the customer had bought
something in the last nine months (and everything else was ignored); and in the other, a more complex computation
to predict which customers were more active / inactive.
In the latter condition, sophisticated statistical methods, such as the Pareto Negative Binomial Distribution model,
took more information into account. The results showed, however, that more information did not lead to better
inferences. The complex model turned out to be less accurate at predicting inactive customers, compared to the
heuristic.
It is a common misconception that optimisation is better than heuristics at decision making, Gigerenzer said. "We
know this is not the case because optimisation models are optimal within their mathematical assumptions. Whether
they are optimal in the real world, we do not know. If just one assumption is not met, then we won't know where it's
going."
Other "textbook" misconceptions: Heuristics are only useful because of human cognitive limitations; and that the
more information, computation and time, the better the decision. But one only has to think about language and
sports to debunk those arguments. "Studies on language acquisition indicate that there are sensitive phases in
which a reduced memory and simpler input (e.g. baby talk) speeds up language acquisition," wrote Gigerenzer.
"Experiments with experienced handball players indicate that they make better decisions with less time; and expert
golfers (but not novices) do better when they have only 3 seconds to putt than when the can take all the time they
want… There is more to heuristics than the accuracy-effort trade-off: The mind can use less information and
computation or take less time and nevertheless achieve better performance."
Ecological rationality
Herbert Simon, according to Gigerenzer, was the academic that first inspired research into heuristics. Simon
proposed that instead of maximising returns, people were "satisficing" – an old English word for 'satisfying' that
means arriving at a "good enough" outcome.
Gigerenzer explained the concept of "bounded rationality" by means of "Simon's Scissors"; the idea that the human
mind matches the environment like two blades of a pair of scissors, complementing one another but not necessary
mirroring one another. In that sense, he said people rely on heuristics based on their assessments of "rationality".
On one end, there is the "as if" model, as illustrated earlier with the ball game example. Here, people may add
parameters to the 'equation' if they feel that the standard optimisation or utility maximisation theories cannot apply
to the phenomenon. On the other end, there is the "homo heuristic", where rationality takes an ecological
framework, influenced by the structure of the environment.
One example is the 'recognition heuristic', where people make decisions based on what they recognise. "Assume
you're in the TV programme, 'Who wants to be a Millionaire'. You've made it all the way to the top. Now, you have
to answer your million dollar question: Which American city has more inhabitants: Milwaukee or Detroit?" he asked
the audience. A majority picked Detroit – the correct answer.
A similar test had been conducted in America and in Germany. In America, the proportion of correct responses was
about 60%. In Germany, about 90% got the right answer. So how is it possible that Germans could make better
inferences about American than the Americans? Gigerenzer explained that few Germans are familiar with either of the
states. However, most of them have heard of Detroit while almost none had ever heard of Milwaukee.
"They used the recognition heuristic, which is that if you've never heard of Milwaukee but you've heard of Detroit,
Detroit is probably larger. This is ecologically rational in a world where the media often talks more about the bigger
things than smaller things."
"All inductive processes, including heuristics, make bets… its accuracy is always relative to the structure of the
environment," Gigerenzer wrote in his paper. The emphasis should thus be on which heuristic works better in which
environment, and why a heuristic might fail or succeed.
Understanding error
To provide an example with practical organisational applications, Gigerenzer spoke of a study he had conducted at a
hospital in Michigan. The hospital was struggling with overcrowding within their coronary care unit – close to 90% of
all patients passing through the emergency room were being sent there. The reason: defensive decision making.
If a patient complains of chest pains and is rushed to an emergency room, doctors have the option of either placing
the patient on a regular bed or at the coronary care unit. It could be a life-or-death decision. "He could get a heart
attack at either of those places. If he doesn't get a heart attack, he wouldn't want to be at the coronary care unit.
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That's a dangerous place to be; people can pick up illnesses there," he said.
Still, doctors protect themselves by putting the patient into a place that lowers their potential risk. "If the patient
dies, the family might sue you if the patient dies on a regular bed from a heart attack. But the doctor or the hospital
will unlikely be sued if the patient dies in the coronary care unit. This is a very important concept – protection from
the potential cost of failure."
Some 93% of US doctors are said to practice defensive medicine; suggesting more treatments and diagnostics than
necessary, Gigerenzer said – due in part to the country's highly litigious environment. When the Michigan hospital
called researchers in to help solve the overcrowding issue, the researchers took a "complex problem, complex
solution" approach. The result: a prediction model based on multiple variables and logistic regression.
At the same time, a simple heuristic termed "fast and frugal tree" was constructed, based on a smaller set of criteria
that asks decision makers a series of three questions. From these questions, doctors could then choose where to
place the patient. "How many of you would still rather trust defensive decision making (the doctor default choice)?
Or would you trust the logistic regression or the heuristic?" Gigerenzer asked the audience, before revealing the
results of the study (see Figure 1)
While the statistical model showed mixed results, good and bad, it did not allow for much flexibility as the criteria
and assumptions were all clearly defined. The heuristic, on the other hand, produced a positive outcome and gave
decision makers greater leeway to adapt to new information. Finally, defensive decision-making, without help from
models or heuristics, stood a great chance of error. 
Source: G. Gigerenzer (2011, Apr 11) Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences. Lecture
presented at Behavioural Sciences Forum, Singapore Management University.
Getting rid of error
When it comes to predicting outcomes, complex models are likelier to contain error. Here, Gigerenzer said that while
'error' is a sum of 'bias', 'variance' and 'noise', people often assume, in conventional computations, that 'bias' is
somehow worse than 'variance'.
Total error = (bias)2 + variance + noise
Gigerenzer conducted an analysis of London's temperature in 2000. The average temperature reading of each day
was computed and patterns were established using various degrees of polynomials – the higher the degree, the
better the 'fit'. And as seen from the graph below, 'degree 12 polynomial' offered a closer fit to the readings,
compared to 'degree 3 polynomial'. 
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Figure 2. Temperatures in London, 2000
When analysed for error, the prediction curve (as denoted by the dotted line below, in Figure 3) shows that error
goes up as the degree of polynomial increases. What this demonstrates is that while complex models may offer a
bigger 'fit', they also give rise to greater error. So while too much simplicity is not optimal for decision making, too
much complexity can lead to a completely unrealistic model, said Gigerenzer. 
Figure 3. Error in predicting the sample and population
When the error was decomposed to uncover levels of 'bias' and 'variance', Gigerenzer found that as models become
more complex, 'bias' falls whereas 'variance' increases (see Figure 4). "This example illustrates a fundamental problem
in statistical inference known as the bias–variance dilemma. To achieve low prediction error on a broad class of
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problems, a model must accommodate a rich class of patterns in order to ensure low bias… Diversity in the class of
patterns that the model can accommodate is, however, likely to come at a price. The price is an increase in
variance," he explained in his paper. 
Figure 4. Error, decomposed for bias and variance
In reducing the 'bias' from the total error, greater "effort" is required to derive a more complex polynomial. Yet, such
efforts may be counterproductive as it increases the 'variance' component of error. It is perhaps paradoxical to note
that more error is created as more resources are expended to guard against uncertainty. Simple heuristics may thus
be better and more accurate at predicting outcomes – due not only to its flexibility, but also because it allows bias.
In an uncertain world, less is more, and that little bit of bias will allow for better inferences, he concluded.
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